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1. Brandom’s theory of reference
The technical notion of particulars or objects as that which 
singular terms purport to refer to has been known at least 
since Frege to be highly theory-laden. Particularly from a 
non-representationalist point of view it is obvious that one 
cannot simply take some domain of particulars as some-
how simply antecedently understood or given. Instead, 
even language-specific syntactic patterns may have a 
crucial bearing on the question of what may, under which 
circumstances, count as an object referred to (Schneider 
1992). To see how deeply this issue is entangled in foun-
dational discussions about reference, it suffices to have a 
look at its repercussions in philosophical and linguistic 
debates, e.g., with regard to the question of Meinongian 
‘nonexistent objects’ (cf. the defense of some of Meinong’s 
ideas in Parsons 1980) or to the many difficulties with ab-
stract or fictional objects in, say, ‘Millian’ theories of singu-
lar terms. 
From an inferentialist perspective on language 
pragmatics and semantics, Robert Brandom has tried to 
explicate the notion of particular object in terms of singular 
term use, giving a supposedly intra-linguistic, deflationary 
account of reference and rejecting the idea that reference 
should be viewed as some sort of word-world relation 
(Brandom 1994; 2000). In his view, objects are given or 
specified by equivalence classes of symmetrically 
intersubstitutable terms; more precisely, reference to 
particulars is seen as a social practice of attributing and 
undertaking what Brandom calls symmetric material 
substitution-inferential commitments, that is, very roughly, 
commitments to which terms are intersubstitutable salva 
veritate. 
Brandom refines this general picture by an account 
of anaphora as the mechanism that lets linguistic 
tokenings inherit the substitution-inferential commitments 
(and entitlements) associated with other tokenings 
(Brandom 1994, 455 seqq.). Explaining anaphoric 
mechanisms is a vital part of Brandom’s enterprise since 
these mechanisms are needed to account for several 
important and interrelated aspects of his overall account of 
language: First, an understanding of how unrepeatable 
singular term expressions, such as indexical expressions, 
provide a link to extralinguistic circumstances is needed in 
order to explain the empirical contentfulness of language 
use. Second, inter-personal anaphoric connections 
account for the social, interpersonal nature of linguistic 
communication. 
As has been noted by some commentators, 
Brandom’s theoretical outlook on singular term reference 
is, on the face of it, rather strained and idealized at least 
from a linguist’s point of view (cf. Fodor and Lepore 2001). 
To give but one simple example, in many cases the 
possibility of substituting one singular term for another is 
subject to grammatical constraints such as concord. In 
fact, apart from the use of pronominals and other strongly 
context-dependent proforms it is rarely the case that 
speakers would use different context-independent 
descriptions for the same object; they would rather, on 
different occasions, make several different assertions 
about an object, assertions that are linked by an anaphoric 
chain. This already suggests that, in some sense, 
anaphora might be the more primitive, object-constitutive 
relation vis-à-vis substitutional ones. Typically, it is only by 
using nominalization constructions that intersubstitutable 
singular terms come into being in the first place. As far as 
language acquisition is concerned, it seems plausible that 
mastery of anaphoric relationships between utterances 
(such as grasping the kind of semantic link between 
different utterance tokens containing the word mama) 
precedes, or is at least largely independent of, the ability to 
use different expressions (such as mama and dad’s wife) 
that can be more or less always be used interchangeably. 
Perhaps more important in a philosophical context is the 
fact that there are serious problems on the semantic side, 
too; thus, it is possible to understand descriptions whose 
extensions are known to be empty, even though, in such 
cases, no substitutional commitments are undertaken – no 
other term can be taken to be coreferential with the one 
given. A remedy for this problem can be found, I think – 
but it requires looking at the anaphoric relationships empty 
singular terms may entertain to one another. 
2. Inverting Brandom’s order of explanation
In order to solve the above-mentioned and other issues, I 
propose to invert Brandom’s order of explanation, taking 
the notion of coreference (i.e., the anaphoric relation hold-
ing between coreferential singular term tokens) as a theo-
retical basis for a deflationary account of linguistic refer-
ence and ‘objecthood’. Similar to Brandom, the result is a 
non-representationalist view of linguistic reference that 
does not take some relation between (parts of) linguistic 
utterances and aspects or chunks of some possible or 
actual world as its starting point. It is possible (but not con-
ceptually necessary) to explicate the notion of coreference 
as understood here in terms of Brandomian inferentialism, 
starting with an account of what an implicit and normative 
practice of taking two terms in actual discourse to be 
coreferential actually consists in. Of course, if one thinks 
along the lines pursued here, coreference cannot simply 
be defined as the property of different token expressions to 
refer to ‘the same thing’. Suffice it to say here that, in pro-
totypical cases, coreference can create a ‘pragmatic link’ 
between (aspects of) the utterance situation tokens in-
volved – a link that cannot be created by other kinds of 
subsentential expressions. Two subsequently uttered sen-
tences containing the adjective red are normally not 
thereby linked qua utterance tokens; in contrast, two sub-
sequently uttered sentences containing the proper name 
John may give reason for a hearer to establish a pragmati-
cally relevant connection between the two utterance to-
kens (e.g., upon hearing first John is his room and then 
being ordered Summon John here the addressee will 
probably go to John’s room in order to carry out the order). 
The kind of ‘link’ created by coreferential terms is not some 
simple invariant but correlates, roughly speaking, with the 
kind of sortal that one would use in talking about phenom-
ena of the respective kind. Deflationary though this ap-
proach is, it does allow for reconstructing ordinary ‘refer-
ence talk’, even in a much less artificial way than the one 
proposed by Brandom: An utterance like In that utterance, 
the pronoun ‘he’ refers to John Doe is true if and only if the 
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singular term John Doe is coreferential with the pronoun 
he in the utterance token in question. 
3. Consequences and applications
The account of linguistic reference briefly sketched here 
shares many of its strong points with Brandom’s approach, 
since, in many cases, Brandom’s ‘substitutional’ analyses 
have a ‘coreferentialist’ analogue. For lack of space, only 
some hints can be given here. Thus, the account is highly 
neutral with respect to ontological questions, which helps 
to solve some well-known problems by actually dissolving 
them. Thus, Quinean concerns with the ‘inscrutability of 
reference’ simply do not arise when the basic question is 
not which object is referred to on a given occasion, but 
which other utterances ‘refer to the same thing’. Similarly, 
the well-known quarrels about, say, description vs. ‘Millian’ 
theories, or the Kripke belief puzzles (Kripke 1980), can be 
given rather down-to-earth analyses that, incidentally, bear 
some similarity to the line of reasoning in Katz’s “new in-
tensionalism” (Katz 2004) without sharing most of its gen-
eral outlook on semantic or metaphysical questions. 
Less perspicuously, the account proposed here 
might help to throw into relief subtle preconceptions about 
what may or may not be regarded as a ‘proper’ particular 
for a theory of reference. The volatile intuitions 
surrounding the concept of rigid designation are a case in 
point: In the narrowly scoped reading of the sentence The 
president of France might have been bald, the subject is 
usually interpreted as a quantified expression of some 
sort; in ordinary parlance (not Brandom’s, to be sure), it is 
assumed to denote different individuals in different 
possible worlds. On the other hand, a rigid interpretation 
(which takes the nominal phrase to denote some kind of 
“generic concept”) cannot simply be dismissed on a priori 
grounds. Indeed, a ‘generic’ reading of the nominal phrase 
in question would seem rather natural in the context of a 
legal or political discussion of the duties or obligations of 
‘the president of France’ or even ‘the present president of 
France’, when what is at stake is not a certain person but 
properties or requirements concerning a political function. 
Positing such kinds of individuals is not as far-fetched as it 
might seem; for instance, the term the mice that inhabit my 
kitchen every winter might be taken to denote a particular 
with remarkably complex identity criteria, pertaining to a 
reoccurring temporary presence of a group of animals 
whose members are possibly different every time. 
The present proposal differs, however, markedly 
from Brandom’s in being much less committed to a picture 
of reference as being ‘about particular objects’. On close 
reading, this picture still figures prominently in Brandom: 
First, the particulars in a representationalist conception of 
reference are supposed to correspond to Brandom’s 
equivalence classes of terms; second, singular terms, on 
Brandom’s view, can get the empirical content they have 
only through entry moves of the language game, 
specifically, non-inferential perception reports that use 
unrepeatable linguistic items tied up anaphorically with 
repeatable ones. Empirically contentful terms are 
prototypically linked to classes of ‘external circumstances’ 
that Brandom calls “reference classes”. This way, a 
surprisingly direct relation between linguistic expressions 
and a nonlinguistic reference class sneaks in, as it were, 
through the back door. 
In stark contrast, the approach presented here 
allows for a much broader understanding of the semantic 
and pragmatic nature of anaphoric relations, even in cases 
where ‘syntactically conditioned’ anaphoric relations clearly 
cannot be correlated with the idea of one and the same 
‘thing’ being referred to twice. In a sense, what is proposed 
here is a radically deflationary attitude towards the notion 
of object. To take a simple example, the two sentences 
John was told that his mother had left and Every boy was 
told that his mother had left are completely analogous as 
to grammatical structure; yet, Brandom would, similar to 
many logic-based semantic approaches, be forced to 
assume that the semantic analyses of the two sentences 
differ with respect to quantification, with the consequence 
that the anaphoric pronoun his must be treated differently 
in these two cases. However, a philosophical account of 
reference should be able to say something about why this 
difference is so difficult to explain to a layperson. This 
requirement becomes more urgent in a strictly relational 
view on grammatical structure as proposed in (Meyer 
2003), where I argue that assigning a grammatical 
structure to a sentence token supervenes on pragmatically 
grounded relationships between this and other utterance 
tokens: If such a view is on the right track, then it is difficult 
to explain why the two sentences can be ascribed parallel 
syntactic structures in spite of differing significantly in their 
semantic makeup. 
Indeed, the alleged semantic difference between our 
two example sentences virtually disappears in a 
‘coreferentialist’ perspective, where both sentences 
receive a parallel treatment: The two terms in question can 
simply be said to be coreferential in both cases, the 
difference residing rather in what I have called above the 
‘kind of link’ between the coreferential expressions. In 
other words, traditional linguistic issues concerning 
quantification and scope relations can be handled 
successfully in the account presented here. That the idea 
of denying any fundamental difference between the 
anaphoric relations in the two sentences is not simply out 
of place is suggested by otherwise widely differing 
conceptions that try to use a unified description for 
quantified and non-quantified sentences; a remarkable 
recent example is (Shapiro 2004) who, following ideas of 
Kit Fine and others, assimilates a sentence such as Every 
sheep is white to the type of sentence exemplified by Dolly 
is white by proposing a logic of arbitrary and indefinite 
objects that is suitable for real-world language processing 
tasks via semantic networks. Surprisingly, much recent 
work on knowledge representation in this area is 
compatible with the non-denotational approach I propose 
(see also Helbig 22008) and deserves to be placed under 
more scrutiny by philosophers of language.  
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